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Criminal LaW-PERSISTENCE PAYS: ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS TO SOLICIT
ILLEGAL AcTivrrY-United States v. Hinton, 908 F.2d 355 (8th Cir.
1990)
"Human nature is weak enough and sufficiently beset by tempta-
tions without government adding to them and generating crime."'
Justice Felix Frankfurter
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INTRODUCTION
Different types of crime require differing methods of detection. So
called "consensual" crimes, 2 such as drug transactions, are consid-
ered the most difficult to detect, expose, and punish since they occur
in private, and the participants in such crimes do not commonly com-
plain to police.3 Given this reality, law enforcement agencies often
1. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 384 (1958) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
2. Drug offenses are the most common type of consensual crimes (also com-
monly referred to as "victimless" crimes). In addition to drug offenses, offenses such
as bribery, gambling, prostitution and firearm sales are common consensual crimes.
Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agents Provocateurs, 60
YALE L.J. 1091, 1093 (1951). These crimes are labeled as consensual because of the
absence of an unwilling, non-consenting participant or "victim" which exists in
crimes such as theft, assault, robbery, and rape. Almost all reported entrapment
cases arise in the area of consensual or "secret" crimes where no unwilling victims
are involved. Note, Entrapment, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1333, 1338 (1960).
3. See Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REV. 163, 164 (1976). Park
notes that during the five-year period between 1970 and 1975 which he researched
for his article, 65% of the federal cases in which the entrapment defense was raised
involved drug offenses. Id at 230 n.223. Studies generally show that drug use within
the United States population increased during the late seventies and early to mid-
eighties. For example, the number of people using cocaine on a monthly basis went
from one million in 1976 to an estimated five to six million in 1984. PRESIDEr'S
COMM'N ON ORGANIZED CRIME, AMERICA'S HABIT: DRUG ABUSE, DRUG TRAFFICKING
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use undercover agents and informants in their efforts to expose
these types of offenses.4 The most common method employed in
detecting consensual crimes is solicitation of the offense by an in-
formant 5 or an undercover law enforcement official.6 The question
in these cases is whether the individual who was "solicited" would
have participated in the criminal offense if not for the active efforts of
law enforcement officials. 7 This question is at the heart of what is
known as the entrapment defense.
'The recent Eighth Circuit case of United States v. Hinton 8 represents
AND ORGANIZED CRIME 18 (March 1986). There has also been a heightened emphasis
on the detection and punishment of drug offenses during the 1980s. For example,
between fiscal years 1982 and 1986, federal funding for drug law enforcement in-
creased by 70%. Id. at 440. Given the rise in drug use and the corresponding in-
crease in efforts directed at detecting and punishing drug offenders, one would
suspect that the percentage of entrapment cases involving drug offenses would also
increase, perhaps even substantially.
4. Park, supra note 3, at 164. Utilization of "undercover agents is an accepted
and necessary practice, particularly in combatting an ever-expanding narcotics traf-
fic." United States v. Lard, 734 F.2d 1290, 1296 (8th Cir. 1984).
5. Donnelly defines an "informant" as "one who, having participated in an of-
fense, turns against his partners and discloses information to the police[,] [qluite
often under a promise of immunity .... Donnelly, supra note 2, at 1092. Another
type of informant is referred to as a "stool pigeon" and is defined as a person who
"acts as a decoy to draw others into a trap. He solicits the commission of the crime
.... .I d.
6. Id. See also Kibby v. United States, 372 F.2d 598, 602 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
387 U.S. 931 (1967) ("In order to effectively combat the market in contraband goods
such as narcotics .... it is a common police practice for officers or undercover agents
to pose as potential buyers of the illegal merchandise.").
7. The entrapment defense does not apply to situations where a private person
solicits criminal conduct from the defendant or where a private person induces the
defendant to commit a criminal offense. For the defense to apply, a law enforcement
officer or an agent of the government, such as an informant, must induce or solicit
the criminal activity. United States v. Leroux, 738 F.2d 943, 947 (8th Cir. 1984). See
also infra note 122 (discussing this limitation on the entrapment defense).
Some circuits recognize a "derivative" form of the entrapment defense in limited
situations where the government's inducement is indirectly communicated to the de-
fendant by an unwitting middleman or where government agents have acted through
private citizens rather than undercover agents or informants. See, e.g., United States
v. Pilarinos, 864 F.2d 253, 255-56 (2d Cir. 1988). Other circuits steadfastly refuse to
recognize a derivative theory of entrapment. See, e.g., United States v. Stewart, 770
F.2d 825 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1103 (1986). The Eighth Circuit has
not expressly recognized a purely derivative claim of entrapment, but it has ex-
amined the effect of "indirect" solicitations in the context of the entrapment defense.
See United States v. Dion, 762 F.2d 674, 686 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding that two of five
defendants charged and convicted for illegally "taking or selling" eagles were en-
trapped by federal agents even though not directly solicited), aff'd in part and rev 'd in
part on other grounds, 476 U.S. 734 (1986). For a general discussion of the derivative
or indirect theory of entrapment, see Note, Entrapment Through Unsuspecting Middlemen,
95 HARV. L. REV. 1122 (1982).
8. 908 F.2d 355 (8th Cir. 1990).
[Vol. 17
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a typical entrapment case. In Hinton, the defendant took part in a
drug sale after an agent of the government made repeated efforts to
solicit her involvement in the illegal transaction. As such, Hinton
provides an opportunity to examine the Eighth Circuit's application
of the entrapment defense.
I. THE DEFENSE OF ENTRAPMENT
The defense of entrapment evolved slowly. Historically, American
courts treated the defense with a great deal of skepticism;9 the de-
fense did not gain judicial recognition until the early twentieth cen-
tury.tO It was not until 1932, when the Supreme Court issued its
opinion in SorrelLs v. United States tt that federal courts accepted the
defense of entrapment. In Sorrells, a government agent, posing as a
tourist, visited the home of the defendant with several of the defend-
ant's friends.12 Both Sorrells and the agent were veterans of World
War I, and they reminisced about their war experiences.13 During
this visit, the agent repeatedly asked Sorrells if he could obtain some
liquor.t4 On the first two occasions, Sorrells told the agent that he
did not have any liquor. After the third request, Sorrells left his
home and returned a short time later with a half-gallon of whiskey.
The agent paid Sorrells five dollars for the whiskey.15 Sorrells was
charged, tried and convicted of violating the National Prohibition
9. The most often quoted piece of nineteenth century case law on the subject of
entrapment expressed the general legal sentiment toward the entrapment defense:
Even if inducements to commit crime could be assumed to exist in this case,
the allegation of the defendant would be but the repetition of the pleas as
ancient as the world, and first interposed in Paradise: "The serpent beguiled
me and I did eat." That defence was overruled by the great Lawgiver, and
whatever estimate we may form, or whatever judgment pass upon the char-
acter or conduct of the tempter, this plea has never since availed to shield
crime or give indemnity to the culprit, and it is safe to say that under any
code of civilized, not to say Christian ethics, it never will.
Board of Comm'rs v. Backus, 29 How. Pr. 33, 42 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1864). The reference
to the plea first being made in Paradise is taken from Genesis 3:13. That plea was
made to God by Eve after the serpent induced her to eat the fruit from the forbidden
tree of Knowledge.
10. In 1915, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued what is believed to be the
first appellate court decision in which the defense of entrapment was recognized.
Woo Wai v. United States, 223 F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915). For a thorough review of the
historical development of the defense of entrapment in the United States, see Mar-
cus, The Development of Entrapment Law, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 5 (1986).
11. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
12. h. at 439.
13. Id.
14. According to the testimony of the government agent, he asked Sorrells to
find him some liquor on three occasions. Another witness present stated that the
agent may have made up to five requests before the defendant retrieved a bottle of
whiskey for the agent. Id. at 439-40.
15. Id. at 439.
1991]
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Act. 16
At trial and on appeal to the Supreme Court, Sorrells defended his
conduct by claiming he had been entrapped.' 7 In recognizing the
defense for the first time, the Court unanimously agreed that Sorrells
had been entrapped. The Sorrells decision, however, sparked a
heated debate over the foundation, formulation and application of
the entrapment defense.18 To this day, legal scholars and the na-
tion's courts, including the justices of the United States Supreme
Court, remain divided over the proper justification for recognizing
the entrapment defense and the proper standard for establishing
entrapment.
A. The Majority View-The "Subjective" Test of Entrapment
A majority of the Sorrelts Court adopted what is known as the "sub-
jective" test of entrapment.' 9 This decision sets forth the justifica-
tion for recognizing the entrapment defense and the standard for
establishing entrapment. This standard of entrapment is applied
throughout the federal court system.
20
16. Id.
17. Id. at 438-39.
18. Compare Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435,435-52 (1932) (Hughes, C.J.,
delivering the opinion of the court) with Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 453-59 (Roberts, J., con-
curring). While the entire Court agreed that the defendant in Sorrells had been en-
trapped, there was sharp disagreement over the theoretical basis of the entrapment
defense, the standard for determining whether the defendant had been entrapped,
and whether the question of entrapment was one for the judge or the jury.
19. As Justice Stewart noted, the approach adopted by the Sorrells majority has
been labeled the "subjective approach to the defense of entrapment." Russell v.
United States, 411 U.S. 423, 440 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting). The label refers to
the defendant's subjective intent, the focus of the majority test for entrapment. By
contrast, the "objective" standard of entrapment focuses on the conduct of the police
in their attempts to engage the defendant in criminal activity.
The subjective/objective distinction is misleading because focusing on police
conduct, as the "objective" standard does, leaves as much room for subjective value
judgments as the "subjective" examination of the defendant's state of mind. See
Park, supra note 3, at 165-66. Having noted this, the author will continue to refer to
the respective standards as "objective" and "subjective" because of their widespread
use and acceptance.
20. Following the lead of the Supreme Court, all federal circuit courts of appeals
have adopted the subjective formulation of the entrapment defense. See, e.g., United
States v. Pratt, 913 F.2d 982 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 681 (1991); United
States v. Alston, 895 F.2d 1362 (11 th Cir. 1990); United States v. Fusko, 869 F.2d
1048 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Fadel, 844 F.2d 1425 (10th Cir. 1988); United
States v. Dougherty, 810 F.2d 763 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v. Gambino, 788
F.2d 938 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825 (1986); United States v. Elordy, 612 F.2d
986, cert. denied, 447 U.S. 910 (1980); United States v. Jackson, 539 F.2d 1087 (6th
Cir. 1976); United States v. Ewbank, 483 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1973).
As noted, the circuit courts of appeals follow the pronouncements of the
Supreme Court and apply the subjective test. Some circuits, however, require that
[Vol. 17
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The Sorrells majority based the entrapment defense on the implied
intent of Congress to not apply criminal statutes to those who have
committed crimes at the instigation of government officials.21 In Sor-
rells, the government argued that since the criminal act was know-
ingly committed by the defendant, the government's inducement to
commit the act was irrelevant. 22 The Court, however, chose not to
literally interpret or apply the criminal statute in question.23 The
Court determined that Congress did not intend to have a criminal
statute apply where government officials lured an "innocent" indi-
vidual24 into committing a crime in order to prosecute the offender
later.25 After making this determination, the Court set out the stan-
dard for evaluating a claim of entrapment.
The majority in Sorrells stated that the government has entrapped
an individual when "the criminal design originates with the officials
of Government, and they implant in the mind of an innocent person
the disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce its commis-
sion."26 This language is capsulized by the Court in a two-prong test
for determining when a person has been entrapped: (1) "govern-
ment inducement of the crime," and (2) "a lack of predisposition on
the part of the defendant to engage in the criminal conduct."2 7 In
the defendant introduce evidence that the government took action "which created a
substantial risk that the offense [would] be committed by persons other than those
ready to commit it," in order to satisfy the initial burden to properly raise the entrap-
ment defense. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (1985); see, e.g., Alston, 895 F.2d at 1368;
United States v. Toro, 840 F.2d 1221, 1230-31 (5th Cir. 1988). The language quoted
expresses the standard for determining entrapment under the "objective" standard
of entrapment. Introduction of such evidence by the defendant is not, however, the
end of the inquiry under the subjective standard. If the defendant was otherwise
predisposed to commit the crime, then the defendant has not been entrapped even
though the government actions created a substantial risk that a nondisposed person
would commit the solicited offense. Alston, 895 F.2d at 1368; Toro, 840 F.2d at 1230-
31.
21. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 448 (1932); see also Sherman v. United
States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958) ("Congress could not have intended that its statutes
were to be enforced by tempting innocent persons into violations.").
22. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 445.
23. The Court stated that "[l]iteral interpretation of statutes at the expense of
the reason of the law and producing absurd consequences or flagrant injustice has
been frequently condemned." Id. at 446.
24. An "innocent" individual is one who does not already harbor a predisposi-
tion to commit the crime charged. See infra text accompanying notes 36-42.
25. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 448. According to the majority's opinion in Sorrels, an
entrapped individual has engaged in conduct which "lies outside the purview of the
[criminal statute]." Id. at 449. In essence, this means that the defendant is simply
not guilty of the offense, rather than guilty of the offense but excused because of
government's instigation of the otherwise criminal conduct. Id at 452.
26. Id. at 442.
27. Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988).
19911
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practice, the first prong is superfluous;28 the second prong is the es-
sence of the defense.
Under the first prong of the test, it is perfectly appropriate for the
government to undertake clandestine operations to detect and ex-
pose consensual crimes.29 If law enforcement officers do nothing to
induce the defendant to commit a crime, the defendant cannot claim
entrapment.30 Similarly, if the government merely provides the de-
fendant with the opportunity to commit a crime, the defendant has
not been entrapped.3S Thus, no entrapment occurs in consensual
crimes such as drug sales where a government agent merely requests
that the defendant sell the agent illegal narcotics, and the defendant
readily does so. 3 2 If, however, law enforcement officials or their
agents actively induce the defendant to act illegally, then the entrap-
ment claim will only succeed where the defendant was not "predis-
posed" to commit the crime charged.33 The Supreme Court has
acknowledged an emphasis on the second prong, stating that "the
principal element in the defense of entrapment [is] the defendant's
predisposition to commit the crime."3 4
28. Justice Frankfurter, in his concurring opinion in Sherman v. United States,
called the first prong of the subjective test "unrevealing," adding that in all cases
where police solicit criminal activity from a defendant, "the intention that the partic-
ular crime be committed originates with the police .... Sherman v. United States,
356 U.S. 369, 382 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Under the subjective test of
entrapment, merely soliciting the crime or simply providing the accused with the op-
portunity to commit the crime charged does not, however, constitute entrapment.
See infra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
29. "Criminal activity is such that stealth and strategy are necessary weapons in
the arsenal of the police officer." Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372. See also Sorrells, 287 U.S. at
453-54 (Roberts, J., concurring) (Police may use "traps, decoys, and deception to
obtain evidence of the commission of crime.").
30. For example, where the defendant unwittingly initiates a criminal act with an
undercover agent but still claims entrapment, the defendant's claim will fail. Since it
was the accused who solicited the official's participation in the crime, the accused
cannot satisfy the first prong of the subjective entrapment defense. In such cases,
"criminal design" clearly originates with the defendant since the government official
did nothing to induce the defendant's illegal conduct. See, e.g., Willis v. United
States, 530 F.2d 308, 312 (8th Cir. 1976) (no entrapment when defendant initiated
illegal drug sale by approaching government agents and showing them a large sum of
money and assuring them he had outlets for drugs).
31. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372. See also Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 441. "It is well settled
that the fact that officers or employees of the Government merely afford opportuni-
ties or facilities for the commission of the offense does not defeat the prosecution.
Artifice and stratagem may be employed to catch those engaged in criminal enter-
prises." Id.
32. Kibby v. United States, 372 F.2d 598, 602 (8th Cir. 1967). See also Sorrells,
287 U.S. at 445 (" 'It is well settled that decoys may be used to entrap criminals, and
to present opportunity to one intending or willing to commit crime.' ") (quoting
Newman v. United States, 299 F. 128, 131 (4th Cir. 1924)).
33. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 433 (1973).
34. See id. The subjective test examines the origin of the "criminal design" or
[Vol. 17
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According to the second prong of the test, the defense of entrap-
ment exists only for the "unwary innocent" who commits a crime at
the urging of law enforcement officials; the defense is not available to
the "unwary criminal" who commits a crime.35 The characterization
of the defendant as an "unwary innocent" or an "unwary criminal"
depends upon an examination of the defendant's conduct and pre-
disposition to commit the criminal act.36 An "innocent" person is
one who is not "predisposed" to commit the crime involved.37 To
determine whether the defendant is "predisposed," the defendant's
subjective intent is examined. 38 If the evidence establishes that the
defendant was ready and willing to commit the offense at any
favorable opportunity, the defendant is deemed "predisposed" and
has not been entrapped. 39 On the other hand, if the defendant was
not predisposed but was lured into committing the crime by agents
of the government, the defendant has been entrapped.40 If there is a
finding of predisposition, the entrapment defense is unavailable, 41
even if the government has used unduly persuasive methods in order
to encourage the defendant to act criminally.42 Only when the con-
"intent." See Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 442. This examination focuses on the origin of the
intent to commit the type of offense charged, rather than the specific crime charged.
It is only logical that the true focus be the intent to commit the type of offense
charged, since the criminal design or intent to commit the specific criminal act for
which the defendant is charged always originates with the government in cases where
the defendant responds to an officer's solicitation to engage in criminal activity.
Park, supra note 3, at 176-77, 244-45.
35. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372.
36. Id. at 373.
37. See Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451.
38. As stated in Sorrells: "[1If the defendant seeks acquittal by reason of entrap-
ment he cannot complain of an appropriate and searching inquiry into his own con-
duct and predisposition .... " Id.
39. United States v. Lard, 734 F.2d 1290, 1293 (8th Cir. 1984).
40. "[Wlhen the criminal design originates with the officials of Government, and
they implant in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged
offense and induce its commission," the defendant has been entrapped. Sorrels, 287
U.S. at 442.
41. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 488-89 (1976).
42. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 440 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (If
the defendant had the predisposition to commit the crime, the defendant has not
been entrapped "regardless of the nature and extent of the Government's participa-
tion" in soliciting the defendant in criminal activity.) (citing Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451).
Illustrative of this point is the case of United States v. Principe, 482 F.2d 60 (1st Cir.
1973). In Principe, a government informant made repeated and highly emotional ap-
peals to persuade a friend, who at the time was enrolled in a methadone program, to
set up a drug deal. Id. at 61. The court stated that, while this type of activity "re-
flect(s] no great credit on the government... [,] the ultimate focus of concern is not
on the law enforcement techniques employed by the government, however question-
able these may be, but rather on the defendant's own 'predisposition' to commit the
crime." Id. at 62. See also United States v. Navar, 611 F.2d 1156 (5th Cir. 1980)
(Defense of entrapment is destroyed by defendant's predisposition regardless of the
19911
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duct of government agents is so outrageous as to constitute a viola-
tion of due process principles will the conviction of a predisposed
defendant be barred.43
nature and extent of the government's inducement.); United States v. Spivey, 508
F.2d 146 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 949 (1975) (Fact that government
informant let defendant move in with him, let him live rent-free, provided him with
food and money, and hosted "pot parties" for the defendant and the neighbors did
not matter since the defendant's predisposition had been established.).
Even when governmental agents go so far as to engage in illegal conduct with a
defendant, the defendant is not entrapped under the subjective standard of entrap-
ment if the defendant is predisposed. As the Court stated in Hampton v. United States,
"[i]f the police engage in illegal activity in concert with a defendant beyond the scope
of their duties the remedy lies, not in freeing the equally culpable defendant, but in
prosecuting the police under the applicable provisions of state or federal law."
Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 490 (1976).
43. In Russell, the Supreme Court left open the possibility that a conviction of a
predisposed defendant could be barred under due process principles if police con-
duct was especially outrageous. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32. In that case, an under-
cover agent supplied the defendant with the chemical phenyl-2-propanone, an
ingredient necessary for manufacturing the illegal drug methamphetamine. The
chemical is scarce and difficult to obtain. Id at 426, 431. Without it, the drug cannot
be manufactured. Id. at 431. The Ninth Circuit had held that providing this essential
ingredient constituted "an intolerable degree of government participation in the
criminal enterprise" and established entrapment as a matter of law. United States v.
Russell, 459 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 411 U.S. 423 (1973). In reversing
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court noted that the defendant
conceded that the jury's finding of predisposition was supported by the evidence.
The Court determined that this concession completely precluded the defendant from
establishing entrapment. Russell, 411 U.S. at 436. In so ruling the Court impliedly
overturned two lower court decisions, United States v. Bueno, 447 F.2d 903 (5th Cir.
1971), and United States v. Chisum, 312 F. Supp. 1307 (C.D. Cal. 1970), which held
that a defendant is entrapped as a matter of law when the government provides the
defendant with contraband, regardless of the defendant's predisposition. See also
Hampton, 425 U.S. at 489-90 (The Court expressly stated that due process is not vio-
lated when the government provides an accused with illegal drugs as part of an un-
dercover operation.). In dictum in Russell, however, Justice Rehnquist, speaking for
the Court, stated that "[w]hile we may some day be presented with a situation in
which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process prin-
ciples would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to ob-
tain a conviction, the instant case is distinctly not of that breed." Russell, 411 U.S. at
431-32 (citation omitted).
Justice Rehnquist, apparently unhappy with his choice of language in Russell, at-
tempted to close the door on due process claims in entrapment cases when he an-
nounced the opinion of the Court three years later in Hampton. Justice Rehnquist,
joined by Justice White and ChiefJustice Burger, stated that the remedy of a defend-
ant for any improper conduct on the part of government agents in soliciting criminal
activity lies solely in the defense of entrapment. The conviction of a predisposed
defendant cannot be barred by a due process violation on the part of the govern-
ment. In cases where the officers engage in illegal conduct or violate the principles
of due process, "the remedy lies, not in freeing the equally culpable defendant, but in
prosecuting the police under applicable provisions of state or federal law." Hampton,
425 U.S. at 490.
Five justices disagreed with this statement and with Justice Rehnquist's charac-
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Under the subjective test, the defendant has the burden of produc-
ing evidence showing that government agents induced the defendant
to commit the crime.44 Once the defendant produces such evidence,
the burden shifts to the prosecution to establish beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime.45
terization of the Russell decision. Justices Powell, Blackmun, Brennan, Stewart and
Marshall all agreed that Russell did not foreclose a court from barring the conviction
of a predisposed defendant, on either due process principles or by exercise of the
supervisory power of the court, in cases where the conduct of law enforcement offi-
cials was sufficiently offensive. Id. at 493 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment),
497 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Based on the language in Russell, predisposed defendants often argue that they
should not be convicted, given the outrageous nature of the conduct of government
agents in soliciting criminal activity from them. While the predisposed defendant
may continue to raise a due process defense in entrapment cases after Hampton, the
defense has been met with nearly universal rejection. If, as Justice Rehnquist says,
the entrapment defense is "relatively limited," Russell, 411 U.S. at 435, the due pro-
cess defense is, in reality, virtually non-existent.
For example, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that "police conduct
becomes the proper point of inquiry only in the rare situation where it is too outra-
geous to be overlooked." Gunderson v. Schlueter, 904 F.2d 407, 410 (8th Cir.
1990). The level of outrageousness required is quite high:
Granting that a person is predisposed to commit an offense, we think that it
may safely be said that investigative officers and agents may go a long way in
concert with the individual in question without being deemed to have acted
so outrageously as to violate due process or evoke the exercise by the courts
of their supervisory power so as to deny to the officers the fruits of their
misconduct.
United States v. Quinn, 543 F.2d 640, 648 (8th Cir. 1976). In fact, the Eighth Circuit
has never found the conduct of law enforcement officials to have reached the level of
outrageousness required to support a due process violation in an entrapment case.
Gunderson, 904 F.2d at 410. In a limited number of other cases, however, courts have
barred the conviction of a predisposed defendant in an entrapment case on grounds
that police conduct in the solicitation violated principles of due process. See, e.g.,
United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978) (Court found substantive due
process violation where DEA agent gave the defendant the idea to manufacture
drugs, gave him the money to buy the chemicals necessary to manufacture the drugs,
provided him with technical expertise regarding the manufacturing process, and gave
him a place to set up a drug laboratory.).
44. See United States v. French, 683 F.2d 1189, 1191 n.1 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 972 (1982) (reciting approved jury instruction); United States v. Sherman,
200 F.2d 880, 882 (2d Cir. 1952) ("On the.., question [of government inducement]
the accused has the burden."). But see United States v. West, 898 F.2d 1493, 1502
(11 th Cir. 1990) ("To raise entrapment a defendant must prove more than that the
government first solicited him .... "); United States v. Hill, 626 F.2d 1301, 1304 (5th
Cir. 1980) ("If there is any evidence . . . that the government's conduct created a
substantial risk" of inducing an innocent actor to commit an offense, a jury issue is
raised.).
45. French, 683 F.2d at 1191 n.1; United States v.Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 597 (3d
Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982); United States v. Mosley, 496 F.2d
1012, 1014-15 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1221-23 (2d
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 950 (1974); United States v. Pollard, 483 F.2d 929,
932 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1137 (1974); United States v. Ambrose, 483
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Whether the defendant was in fact predisposed to commit the of-
fense charged is a question for the jury.46
B. The Minority View-The "Objective" Test
Justice Roberts, in a separate concurring opinion in Sorrells,47 set
forth the minority view which is regarded as the "objective" test of
entrapment. 48 In Sorrells, Justice Roberts agreed that the govern-
ment had entrapped the defendant but took exception to the justifi-
cation for recognizing the entrapment defense and the formulation
of the entrapment standard as advanced by the majority.49
Justice Roberts argued that the majority erred in gleaning the the-
oretical root of the doctrine of entrapment from an "implied legisla-
tive intent." 50 Justice Roberts first noted that the elements of a
crime are enumerated by statute and that the actions of a defendant,
even though induced, are precisely those which the statute pros-
F.2d 742, 752-53 (6th Cir. 1973); Martinez v. United States, 373 F.2d 810, 812 (10th
Cir. 1967); Notaro v. United States, 363 F.2d 169, 175-76 (9th Cir. 1966); Sherman,
200 F.2d at 882-83.
For a defendant to carry his burden to properly raise the entrapment defense
and shift the burden to the government, most courts have required that the defend-
ant produce evidence showing inducement. Some federal courts have raised this
standard to a higher level, requiring that the defendant not only produce evidence of
government inducement, but also produce evidence indicating the defendant's own
lack of predisposition before the burden shifts to the government. See, e.g., United
States v. Fusko, 869 F.2d 1048, 1052 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Gambino, 788
F.2d 938, 943 (3d Cir. 1986).
46. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 377 (1958); Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 454.
But see State v. Grilli, 304 Minn. 80, 95, 230 N.W.2d 445, 455 (1975) (The defendant
may choose whether the issue is to be decided by the judge or the jury, even though
Minnesota applies the subjective standard of the entrapment defense.).
47. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 453-59 (Roberts, J., concurring). Justice Stone and Jus-
tice Brandeis joined in Justice Roberts' concurrence.
48. Justice Stewart referred to the standard of entrapment advanced by Justice
Roberts as the "objective approach." Russell v. United States, 411 U.S. 423, 441
(1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting). The "objective" test focuses on the conduct and ac-
tion of law enforcement officials in their efforts to enlist the defendant in criminal
activity. See Sherman, 356 U.S. at 380 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). This formulation
of the entrapment standard is also referred to as the "hypothetical-person" test of
entrapment. Park, supra note 3, at 165 n.2.
49. Justice Roberts' principal concern was that, in establishing predisposition,
the prosecution would introduce evidence of the accused's prior criminal conduct,
bad acts, and reputation. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 458-59 (Roberts, J., concurring); see also
Park, supra note 3, at 201-02, 237. Park argues that the government should not be
allowed to introduce evidence of the defendant's prior convictions or criminal repu-
tation to establish predisposition. Rather, the government should be limited to es-
tablishing predisposition by means of other evidence, such as the defendant's quick
acquiescence in the crime, the defendant's display of expert knowledge regarding the
criminal activity, and the defendant's easy access to contraband goods. Id.
50. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 454-57.
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cribes.5t Given that the statute does nothing more than set forth the
elements of the crime, the "implied legislative intent" rationale ad-
vanced by the majority is infirm.52 Justice Frankfurter, another pro-
ponent of the objective standard, followed Justice Roberts' lead in
attacking the legislative intent rationale as "fictitious."53 Justice
Frankfurter argued that a criminal "statute is wholly directed to de-
fining and prohibiting the substantive offense concerned and ex-
presses no purpose, either permissive or prohibitory, regarding the
police conduct that will be tolerated in the detection of the crime."54
Under this construction, one should not look to the statute for a pol-
icy which was clearly not within the contemplation of Congress.55
Accordingly, the defense of entrapment cannot be based on a theory
51. Id at 456. In his concurring opinion in Sherman, Justice Frankfurter stated:
In these cases raising claims of entrapment, the only legislative intention
that can with any show of reason be extracted from the statute is the inten-
tion to make criminal precisely the conduct in which the defendant has en-
gaged. That conduct includes all the elements necessary to constitute
criminality.... If [the defendant] is to be relieved from the usual punitive
consequences, it is on no account because he is innocent of the offense
described.
Sherman, 356 U.S. at 379-80. Justice Stewart echoed this theme in Russell:
Furthermore, to say that such a defendant is "otherwise innocent" or not
"predisposed" to commit the crime is misleading, at best. The very fact that
he has committed an act that Congress has determined to be illegal demon-
strates conclusively that he is not innocent of the offense. He may not have
originated the precise plan or the precise details, but he was "predisposed"
in the sense that he has proved to be quite capable of committing the crime.
Russell, 411 U.S. at 442.
52. Justice Roberts not only contended that it was impossible to find the legisla-
tive intent uncovered by the majority, he also argued that the legislative intent ration-
ale advanced by the majority was, in reality, a modification of the statute, amounting
to the addition of an element not contained within the terms of the statute. Accord-
ing to Justice Roberts, "[tihis amounts to saying that one who with full intent com-
mits the act defined by law as an offense is nevertheless by virtue of the unspoken and
implied mandate of the statute to be adjudged not guilty by reason of someone's [sic]
else improper conduct." Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 456 (Roberts,J., concurring). AsJustice
Roberts also noted, the theoretical underpinning of the subjective standard, ad-
vanced by the majority in Sorrels, erodes when the defense of entrapment is applied
to cases of common law crime. Id. at 455. Common law crimes are not defined by
statute. Therefore, if a defendant alleged the defense of entrapment to a common
law crime, there could be no examination of legislative intent because no legislation
exists. Id. Although this point exposes a major flaw in the theoretical foundation of
the subjective test, it may be a moot point since today nearly all criminal offenses are
statutorily defined.
53. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 381 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justices Brennan,
Douglas and Harlan joined in Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion.
54. Id.
55. Id. In recent years, dissenting opinions have echoed similar criticisms of the
subjective approach. See, e.g., Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 496 (1975)
(Brennan,J., dissenting); Russell, 411 U.S. at 436 (Douglas,J., dissenting); Russell, 411
U.S. at 441 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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of implied legislative intent but must rest on public policy grounds.56
According to advocates of the objective standard, the public policy
underlying the entrapment defense is protection against misconduct
and overreaching by law enforcement officers.57
Justices advocating the objective test of entrapment assert that the
doctrine is based on a belief that certain "methods employed on be-
half of the Government to bring about [a] conviction cannot be
countenanced."58 Accordingly, the objective test focuses exclusively
on the actions taken by law enforcement officials in their efforts to
enlist the defendant in criminal activity rather than on the defend-
ant's predisposition to commit the crime. 59 The question a trial
court must resolve when using the objective test is whether police
conduct fell below an acceptable standard.6 0 Since the objective
standard has never commanded a majority of the Supreme Court,61 a
56. See Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 457.
57. See id. at 454.
58. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 380 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Jurisdictions applying
the objective standard, like those adhering to the subjective standard, agree that
merely offering the defendant an opportunity to commit a crime is not improper and
does not establish entrapment. Under the objective standard, however, it is "imper-
missible for the police or their agents to pressure the suspect by overbearing conduct
such as badgering, cajoling, [and] importuning .... " People v. Barraza, 23 Cal. 3d
675, 690, 591 P.2d 947, 955, 153 Cal. Rptr. 459, 467 (1979).
59. See Russell, 411 U.S. at 441 (Stewart, J., dissenting). "[T]he focus of this ap-
proach is not on the propensities and predisposition of a specific defendant," rather,
the question is whether "governmental agents have acted in such a way as is likely to
instigate or create a criminal offense." Id. See also Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S.
58, 66-67 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring) (maintaining that, but for strong prece-
dent, the entrapment defense should be focused exclusively on government con-
duct); Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 496-97 (1975) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (Basis for entrapment defense should be the elimination of unacceptable
methods employed by government.); Sherman, 356 U.S. at 384 (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring) (Objective test shifts attention from the defendant's predisposition to the
conduct of the police.); Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 459 (Roberts, J., concurring) ("Courts
must be closed to the trial of a crime instigated by the government's own agents.").
State courts adopting the objective standard follow this focus. "[U]nder this test
such matters as the character of the suspect, his predisposition to commit the offense,
and his subjective intent are irrelevant." Barraza, 23 Cal. 3d at 691, 591 P.2d at 956,
153 Cal. Rptr. at 468.
60. "The crucial question, not easy of answer, to which the court must direct
itself is whether the police conduct revealed in the particular case falls below stan-
dards, to which common feelings respond, for the proper use of governmental
power." Sherman, 356 U.S. at 382.
61. As the composition of the Court has become more conservative over the last
fifteen years, the size of the majority advocating the subjective standard has in-
creased. In Sorrells (1932), Sherman (1957), and Russell (1972), the Court split 5/4 in
favor of the subjective standard. The Hampton (1975) case involved a 5/3 split, with
Justice Stevens not participating in the decision. The most recent entrapment case
before the Court was Mathews in 1987. The Mathews Court examined whether a de-
fendant could alternatively plead entrapment while denying one or more elements of
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detailed statement regarding what type of police conduct is permissi-
ble has not been enunciated. The standard typically applied in juris-
dictions advocating the objective test is whether the actions of the
police "create a substantial risk that [the] offense will be committed
by persons other than those who are ready to commit it."62
The objective standard also differs from the subjective standard
with respect to allocation of the burden of proof and the role of
judge and jury.63 Under the objective standard, both the burden of
production and the burden of persuasion rest with the defendant.64
Furthermore, the question of entrapment is typically reserved for the
court rather than submitted to the jury.65 The question of entrap-
the crime. The case did not focus specifically on the entrapment standard. Nonethe-
less, the opinions indicate that the split on the Court regarding the proper entrap-
ment standard (subjective vs. objective), was 7/1, and perhaps even 8/0 (Justice
Kennedy did not participate in the decision).
The last two clear advocates of the objective standard remaining on the court
prior to the Mathews decision were Justices Brennan and Marshall. See Hampton v.
United States, 425 U.S. 484, 495-97 (1975) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dis-
senting). Whether Justice Marshall continues to adhere to the objective formulation
of the entrapment standard is unclear from the Mathews opinion. He joined the ma-
jority of the court in recognizing that a defendant can alternatively deny commission
of the crime and plead entrapment. Examination of this issue did not require an
inquiry into the proper standard of entrapment, and Justice Marshall did not sepa-
rately state that he continues to adhere to the objective formulation. Justice Bren-
nan's previously unshakable adherence to the objective standard seems to have
eroded under the weight of precedent from an increasingly conservative bench. In
his concurring opinion he states:
Were I judging on a clean slate, I would still be inclined to adopt the view
that the entrapment defense should focus exclusively on the Government's
conduct. But I am not writing on a clean slate; the Court has spoken defini-
tively on this point. Therefore I bow to stare decisis, and today join the judg-
ment and reasoning of the Court.
Mathews, 485 U.S. at 67 (Brennan, J., concurring).
62. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13(1)(b) (1985). Stated another way: "[W]as the
conduct of the law enforcement agent likely to induce a normally law-abiding person
to commit the offense?" Barraza, 23 Cal. 3d at 689-90, 591 P.2d at 955, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 467. See also 1 NATIONAL COMM'N ON REFORM OF FED. LAWS, A PROPOSED NEW
FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE § 702(2) (1971).
63. For a general discussion of burdens of proof and the role of judge and jury
under the two formulations of the entrapment defense, see Marcus, The Entrapment
Defense and Procedural Issues: Burden of Proof Questions of Law and Fact and Inconsistent
Defense, 22 CRIM. L. BuLL. 197 (1986).
64. A defendant must prove "by a preponderance of the evidence that his con-
duct occurred in response to an entrapment." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13(2) (1985).
See also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:5 (1986) (Entrapment is an affirmative defense.);
id. § 626:7 (Defendant has burden of persuasion by preponderance of evidence as to
affirmative defenses.); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 313(b) (Purdon 1985) (Defendant
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence "that his conduct occurred in re-
sponse to an entrapment."); HAW. REV. STAT. § 702-237 (1988) (Entrapment is an
affirmative defense.).
65. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 441 (1972) ("[D]etermination of
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ment is one for the court rather than the jury because of the courts'
"inherent right... not to be made the instrument of wrong." 66 The
court must be responsible for the "preservation of the purity of its
own temple" 67 by refusing to submit to the "prostitution of the crim-
inal law." 68 Accordingly, at any point in a proceeding where facts
which establish entrapment are introduced, the court should dis-
charge the defendant.69 The question of entrapment goes to the
jury only when there is doubt as to the facts. 70 The opinion of the
jury, however, is merely advisory since the power to dismiss the de-
fendant ultimately rests with the court.7 1 Despite the fact that the
the lawfulness of the Government's conduct must be made.., by the trial judge, not
the jury."); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 385 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring) (Issue of entrapment "is appropriate for the court and not the jury."); Sor-
rells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 457 (1932) ("[Plower and duty to act remain with
the court and not with the jury."). See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13(2) (1985)
("The issue of entrapment shall be tried by the court in the absence of the jury.");
State v. Grossman, 457 P.2d 226, 230 (Alaska 1969) (Entrapment is to be litigated by
the court.). But see State v. Mullen, 216 N.W.2d 375, 382 (Iowa 1974) (following the
objective test but submitting question of entrapment to the jury when operative facts
are in dispute).
66. So-rells, 287 U.S. at 456 (Roberts, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 457.
Clearly entrapment is a facet of a broader problem. Along with illegal
search and seizures, wire tapping, false arrest, illegal detention and the third
degree, it is a type of lawless law enforcement. They all spring from com-
mon motivations. Each is a substitute for skillful and scientific investigation.
Each is condoned by the sinister sophism that the end, when dealing with
known criminals or the "criminal classes," justifies the employment of illegal
means. The Supreme Court has responded, more or less effectively in curb-
ing illegal search and seizures, illegal detention, and wire-tapping by federal
officers and "third degree" practices by state as well as federal police of-
ficers. It has occasionally been suggested that entrapment is sustainable as a
doctrine on the same constitutional grounds as the search and seizure and
the confession cases .... Although the exclusionary rule is explained as a
constitutional or statutory imperative it can be supported by the broad pol-
icy which prevents the judicial power from being employed as an instrument
for the lawless enforcement of the criminal law .... [This] was the view of
Mr. Justice Roberts in the Sorrells case. This view is preferable. Entrapment
should have its footings in the policy of the courts to preserve their own
integrity.
Donnelly, supra note 2, at 1111-12.
68. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 457. As Justice Holmes stated: "I think it a less evil that
some criminals should escape than that the Government should play an ignoble
part." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (HolmesJ., dissenting).
Advocates of the subjective approach view the weight of the interests in the bal-
ance quite differently. For them, the evil of the objective standard is that "it leads to
acquittal of persons who are in fact guilty. By focusing on police conduct rather than
the defendant's predisposition, it creates a risk of acquitting dangerous chronic of-
fenders." People v. Barazza, 23 Cal. 3d 675, 694, 153 Cal. Rptr. 459, 470, 591 P.2d
947, 958 (1979) (Clark, J., dissenting).
69. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 457.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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objective test has never commanded a majority of the Court, it has
been the formulation of the entrapment defense advocated by the
vast majority of criminal law scholars and commentators. 72
State courts are not bound by the subjective standard of entrap-
ment adopted by the Supreme Court and applied within the federal
court system.73 A number of states have-in whole or in part-
adopted the objective standard of the entrapment defense and apply
that standard within their courts. Some have done so legislatively,
74
while others have done so judicially.
75
C. Establishing Predisposition Under the Majority View
Under the subjective formulation of the entrapment defense as ap-
plied in the federal court system, the primary focus is whether the
accused was "predisposed" to commit the crime charged. While the
Supreme Court has not articulated an explicit list of factors to be
72. See, e.g., Goldstein, For Harold Lassiwdil: Some Reflections on Human Dignity, En-
trapment, Informed Consent and the Plea Bargain, 84 YALE LJ. 527 (1975); McClean, In-
formers and Agent Provocateurs, 1969 CRIM. L. REV. 527; Williams, The Defense of
Entrapment and Related Problems in Criminal Prosecution, 28 FORDHAM L. REV. 399 (1959);
Donnelly, supra note 2. But see Park, supra note 3. Park advocates the subjective view
but agrees that the use of prior criminal convictions and hearsay evidence regarding
a defendant's reputation for criminal activity or prior bad acts in order to establish
predisposition should not be allowed.
73. As the Court stated in Russell, entrapment is not a defense of constitutional
dimension. Therefore, Congress is free to adopt any substantive definition of the
defense. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 433 (1973). Since the defense is not
constitutional in nature, states are also free to adopt their own formulations of the
entrapment defense.
74. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-2-209 (Michie 1987); HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 702-
237 (Michie 1988); N.D. CETr. CODE ANN. § 12.1-05-11 (Smith 1985); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 313 (Purdon 1985); Tzx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.06 (Vernon 1974); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-2-303 (1990). In addition, New Jersey codified a standard for en-
trapment which is characterized as a hybrid, or "an amalgam of objective and subjec-
tive elements." NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-12 (West 1982). See also State v. Rockholt,
476 A.2d 1236, 1240 (NJ. 1984).
75. See Grossman v. State, 457 P.2d 226, 231 (Alaska 1969) (objective test; en-
trapment issue to be determined by trial court); People v. Barraza, 23 Cal. 3d 675,
690-91, 591 P.2d 947, 955, 153 Cal. Rptr. 459, 467 (1979) (Objective test used to
reverse conviction for sale of heroin.); State v. Mullen, 216 N.W.2d 375, 382 (Iowa
1974) (Objective test to be applied by jury if facts in dispute); People v. Turner, 390
Mich. 7, -, 210 N.W.2d 336, 342-43 (1973) (Objective test applied to reverse con-
viction for sale of heroin.); State v. Sainz, 84 N.M. 259, 261, 501 P.2d 1247, 1249
(N.M. Ct. App. 1972) (Objective test based on government conduct; conviction for
delivery of narcotics reversed.).
A few states which adhere to the subjective formulation of the entrapment de-
fense have taken the step of excluding evidence of prior criminal activity in order to
establish predisposition. See, e.g., State v. Nelsen, 228 N.W.2d 143, 147 (S.D. 1975).
The same was true in the state of California before it fully abandoned the subjective
approach and embraced the objective approach. People v. Benford, 53 Cal. 2d 1, 11-
12, 345 P.2d 928, 935 (1959).
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examined in determining predisposition, 76 numerous factors may
enter into a court's analysis of whether the defendant was
predisposed.77
Of all the factors typically introduced to establish the defendant's
predisposition, the most common and damaging evidence relied
upon by the prosecution is evidence of the defendant's prior criminal
conduct.T8 Evidence of prior criminal conduct need not be limited
to prior convictions, but can include arrests, crimes for which the
defendant was never prosecuted, or other hearsay evidence regard-
ing the defendant's criminal reputation. 79 Although introducing evi-
dence of the defendant's prior convictions or bad acts and/or poor
character is an established exception to the hearsay rule of evi-
dence,80 this practice has been the most strongly criticized portion of
76. The Court has made reference to specific types of factual information that is
important in respective cases, but it has never set out a list of factors to be examined
in every case in which entrapment is alleged. For example, in Sherman, the court evalu-
ated the following factors to determine whether the defendant was predisposed:
(1) the defendant's hesitancy at taking part in the illegal drug sale; (2) the repeated
solicitations necessary to overcome the defendant's reluctance; (3) whether the de-
fendant stood to realize a profit on the drug transaction; and (4) the defendant's
record of prior similar offenses. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 373-75
(1957). In Sorrells, the Court evaluated the defendant's hesitancy and the repeated
solicitations of the government official, in addition to the defendant's reputation.
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441 (1932).
77. Under the subjective test, predisposition can be established by evidence of
the defendant's prior criminal convictions, arrests, or criminal activity which resulted
neither in arrest nor conviction, by evidence showing the defendant's ready acquies-
cence in the crime or easy access to the illegal substance, by evidence of the defend-
ant's expert knowledge regarding the criminal activity or by evidence of boastful
statements regarding the defendant's criminal activities made by the defendant him-
self during the solicitation process. See Park, supra note 3, at 200-01 and the cases
cited therein.
78. For example, in the few Eighth Circuit cases where the court held that a de-
fendant was entrapped, the defendants involved had no criminal record. See United
States v. Dion, 762 F.2d 674, 690 (8th Cir. 1985) (Defendant "has never been con-
victed of any crime, and has a good reputation as a law-abiding citizen."); United
States v. Lard, 734 F.2d 1290, 1294 (8th Cir. 1984) (Defendant "had not engaged in
any prior criminal conduct.").
The absence of a prior criminal record, however, is not sufficient to establish that
the defendant was entrapped. See, e.g., United States v. Rodrigues, 433 F.2d 760 (1st
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 943 (1971). Lack of prior record or evidence of the
defendant's involvement in criminal activity is not enough to establish entrapment,
for if it were, a first-offender who was predisposed to commit the offense charged
could seek sanctuary in the entrapment defense. Id. at 762. On the other hand, the
presence of a criminal record or evidence that the defendant engaged in prior unlaw-
ful conduct similar to the conduct for which he is charged, even though no criminal
record exists, makes the success of an entrapment defense all but impossible. See
infra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
79. See Park, supra note 3, at 200-01.
80. See, e.g., Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 331 (1966). See also 29 AM.
JUR. 2D Evidence § 321, n.17 (1967 & Supp. 1990) (citing cases which support the rule
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the subjective standard. 8 1
In determining whether entrapment exists, federal courts conduct
the predisposition analysis in a manner which practically guarantees
conviction of a defendant who has previously been involved in crimi-
nal activity. Evidence that the defendant engaged in prior illegal
conduct which is similar to that for which the defendant is charged is
nearly insurmountable evidence of predisposition.82 Arguably, if a
that introduction of evidence of other criminal acts committed by the defendant is
allowed when offered to rebut a defense such as entrapment).
81. In a separate concurring opinion in Sorrells v. United States, Justice Roberts,
while supporting the majority's recognition that the defendant had been entrapped,
soundly criticized introducing evidence of the defendant's prior criminal activity to
establish predisposition and rebut a claim of entrapment:
Whatever may be the demerits of the defendant or his previous infractions
of law these will not justify the instigation and creation of a new crime, as a
means to reach him and punish him for his past misdemeanors. [The de-
fendant] has committed the crime in question, but, by supposition, only be-
cause of instigation and inducement by a government officer. To say that
such conduct by an official of government is condoned and rendered innoc-
uous by the fact that the defendant had a bad reputation or had previously
transgressed is wholly to disregard the reason for refusing the processes of
the court to consummate an abhorrent transaction. It is to discard the basis
of the doctrine and in effect to weigh the equities as between the govern-
ment and the defendant when there are in truth no equities belonging to the
latter, and when the rule of action cannot rest on any estimate of the good
which may come of the conviction of the offender by foul means. The ac-
cepted procedure, in effect, pivots conviction in such cases, not on the com-
mission of the crime charged, but on the prior reputation or some former
act or acts of the defendant not mentioned in the indictment.
The applicable principle is that courts must be closed to the trial of a
crime instigated by the government's own agents. No other issue, no com-
parison of equities as between the guilty official and the guilty defendant,
has any place in the enforcement of this overruling principle of public
policy.
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 458-59 (1932). Commentators echo this criti-
cal theme:
It is a strange doctrine that makes guilt or innocence depend upon whether
a defendant has committed other similar offenses. However bad a person
may be, however guilty of crime, it is nevertheless a principle of our system
of criminal law administration that conviction and punishment must be for
some specific act or crime proved against an accused by competent evidence
compelling an inference of guilt as to a specific act, and not for a general
depravity or wickedness. The admission of this kind of evidence invariably
prejudices the jury against the accused and diverts their attention from an
impartial consideration of the evidence of the particular crime charged. It is
difficult to justify the injection into a trial for a specific offense hearsay com-
plaints or officer's suspicions about other offenses. And even if proved,
prior transgressions do not compel a logical inference that the defendant
did in fact commit the particular offense.
Donnelly, supra note 2, at 1108.
82. See Annotation, Admissibility of Evidence of Other Offenses in Rebuttal of Defense of
Entrapment, 61 A.L.R.3D 293 (1982) (collection of cases in which evidence of prior
criminal convictions was used to establish predisposition and defeat the entrapment
defense).
Since the test is predisposition to commit the type of crime charged, rather than
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defendant has previously engaged in similar illegal conduct, a pre-
sumption arises that the defendant remains forever predisposed.
Therefore, it is practically impossible for a defendant who was previ-
ously involved in similar criminal activity to establish entrapment, re-
gardless of the extreme conduct or methods employed by law
enforcement officials in their efforts to enlist the defendant in crimi-
nal activity. 83
In applying the predisposition test in this manner, the "rehabilita-
tion" goal of the criminal justice system is ignored.8 4 Advocates of
the objective standard of entrapment criticize the subjective test be-
cause it seems to allow law enforcement officials to play by a different
set of rules when dealing with persons known to have previously en-
gaged in illegal conduct.85 This dilemma for prior offenders was
seemingly not envisioned by the architects of the subjective standard
of entrapment.
The Court, in Sherman v. United States,86 indicated its displeasure
predisposition to commit the specific action for which the defendant is charged, evi-
dence of prior illegal acts similar in nature to that for which the defendant is charged
is extremely strong evidence of predisposition. See supra note 34 and accompanying
text.
83. Under the subjective standard, the conviction of a predisposed defendant will
not be overturned on an entrapment theory on the grounds that law enforcement
officers engaged in outrageous conduct. See supra note 42. The only possible defense
available to a predisposed defendant is a due process argument. See supra note 43
and accompanying text.
84. Since the focus of the objective test is on police conduct, courts applying this
test are apt to be more sensitive to cases in which past drug offenders or users were
trying to reform themselves only to eventually have their resistance worn down by
"overzealous" law enforcement agents. See People v. Barraza, 23 Cal. 3d 675, 691,
591 P.2d 947, 956, 153 Cal. Rptr. 459, 468 (1979).
85. As Justice Frankfurter stated in his concurring opinion in Sherman v. United
States: "Permissible police activity does not vary according to the particular defend-
ant concerned; surely if two suspects have been solicited at the same time in the same
manner, one should not go to jail simply because he has been convicted before and is
said to have a criminal disposition." Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 383
(1958).
Justice Stewart repeated this strain of criticism in his dissenting opinion in United
States v. Russell, stating that focusing on the defendant's predisposition "has the direct
effect of making what is permissible or impermissible police conduct depend upon
the past record and propensities of the particular defendant involved." United States
v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 443 (1973). See also 1 NATIONAL COMM'N ON REFORM OF FED.
CRIM. LAWs, WORKING PAPERS 303, 306-07 (July 1970) ("One of the most serious
shortcomings of the [subjective] entrapment law is that the predisposition element
tends to encourage or tempt law enforcement into a 'devil-may-care' or 'anything
goes' attitude toward persons of a known criminal reputation.").
Some commentators express doubt that police officers specifically "target" past
offenders in drug sale cases since an informer typically determines who the solicited
"seller" will be, and this determination usually is not predicated on whether the solic-
ited seller has a prior criminal record. See, e.g., Park, supra note 3, at 259-60.
86. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
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with relying on evidence of the defendant's prior criminal activity as
the primary indication of the defendant's predisposition. The de-
fendant in Sherman was charged and convicted of selling illegal nar-
cotics.8 7 A government informant repeatedly asked Sherman to sell
him heroin.88 At the time of these solicitations, Sherman was under-
going treatment for his own drug addiction.8 9 In response to Sher-
man's claim of entrapment, the government introduced evidence of
the defendant's prior criminal record-a nine-year old conviction for
selling illegal narcotics and a five-year old conviction for possessing
illegal narcotics. The Court determined that evidence of these prior
convictions, even though for similar offenses,90 was insufficient to
prove that Sherman was predisposed to sell illegal narcotics.91
In addition to relying on evidence of the defendant's prior crimi-
nal conduct, the government often seeks to establish the defendant's
predisposition by showing that the defendant readily acquiesced in
the criminal act.9 2 For example, in Sherman, the government also
sought to establish Sherman's predisposition by showing that he
readily complied with the informant's requests that Sherman sell him
narcotics.93 The Court found this argument unpersuasive, noting
that Sherman did not acquiesce in the illegal transaction until after
the informant had made a number of requests.94 Similarly, in Sorrels
87. Id. at 371-72.
88. Id. at 373.
89. Id,
90. Evidence of prior convictions which are not similar in nature to the offense
with which the defendant is charged is generally not competent evidence for estab-
lishing predisposition. Park, supra note 3, at 176-77.
91. The Court stated that these "conviction[s] . . . are insufficient to prove [the
defendant] had a readiness to sell narcotics at the time [the government informer]
approached him .... " Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 375 (1958). It is
unclear from this language whether the Court is focusing on the defendant's predis-
position at the time the government agent originally approached the defendant or at
the time the illegal transaction finally took place. The rule seems to be that the rele-
vant time period for examining the defendant's predisposition is the time the govern-
ment agent originally approached the defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Lasuita,
752 F.2d 249, 253 (6th Cir. 1985) (The government must prove predisposition "at
the time of the initial contact" between the government and the defendant, rather
than at the time the offense is actually committed.).
92. Park, supra note 3, at 200.
93. Shermap, 356 U.S. at 375.
94. "One request was not enough, for [the government informer] tells us that
additional ones were necessary to overcome, first, [the defendant's] refusal, then his
evasiveness, and then his hesitancy in order to achieve capitulation." Id. at 373. In
overturning Sherman's conviction, the Court noted that his case "illustrates an evil
which the defense of entrapment is designed to overcome." Id. at 376. The "evil"
the Court was concerned with was the fact that
[t]he government informer entices someone attempting to avoid narcotics
not only into carrying out an illegal sale but also into returning to the
habit.... Thus the Government plays on the weaknesses of an innocent
1991)
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v. United States,95 the Court prominently noted that Sorrells' acquies-
cence in the illegal liquor sale was achieved only after repeated and
persistent solicitation by the government agent.9 6
Various circuit courts of appeals afford more substance to the pre-
disposition analysis by enunciating specific factors that are relevant
to determining the defendant's predisposition. For example, the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. Perez-Leon,9
7 lists
five relevant factors in determining the defendant's predisposition.
These factors are:
(1) assessing the character or reputation of the defendant, includ-
ing any prior criminal record;
(2) whether the suggestion of criminal activity was made by the
government;
(3) whether the defendant was engaged in criminal activity for
profit;
(4) whether the defendant expressed reluctance to commit the of-
fense which was overcome only by repeated government induce-
ment or persuasion; and
(5) the nature of the inducement or persuasion applied by the
government.9 8
The fourth factor, whether the defendant expressed reluctance to
commit the offense which was overcome only after repeated solicita-
tion and persuasion by the government, is considered the most im-
portant of the five factors.9 9 Unlike other circuits, the Eighth Circuit
has not formulated a clear set of factors to be examined when deter-
mining a defendant's predisposition.tOO
party and beguiles him into committing crimes which he otherwise would
not have attempted. Law enforcement does not require methods such as
this.
Id. (citation omitted).
95. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
96. Id. at 441.
97. 757 F.2d 866 (7th Cir. 1985).
98. Id. at 871. The trier of fact must examine these five factors in determining
whether the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime. Id. These five factors
were first enunciated in United States v. Reynosa-Ulloa, 548 F.2d 1329, 1336 (9th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 926 (1978). Other circuit courts subsequently
adopted these factors as the boundaries for inquiring into the defendant's predispo-
sition. See, e.g., United States v. Kaminski, 703 F.2d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 1983).
99. Perez-Leon, 757 F.2d at 871. See also infra text accompanying note 126.
100. In United States v. Dion, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals listed the follow-
ing ten factors which other courts have looked to in determining predisposition:
(1) whether the defendant readily responded to the inducement offered;
(2) the circumstances surrounding the illegal conduct;
(3) " 'the state of a defendant before government agents make any sugges-
tion that he shall commit a crime;' "
(4) whether the defendant was engaged in an existing course of conduct
similar to the crime for which [the defendant] is charged;
(5) whether the defendant had already formed the "design" to commit the
crime for which [the defendant] is charged;
[Vol. 17
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II. UNITED STATES V. HINTON: THE FACTS
In United States v. Hinton, 10 , Robert Grover, Jr., knew the defendant
Delecia Hinton. The defendant had used drugs with him and located
cocaine sources for him in the past.10 2 On March 4, 1989, Grover
was arrested and charged with possession with intent to distribute
cocaine. A few days after his arrest, police officers approached
Grover and requested his cooperation in locating and arresting other
cocaine sources.10 3 The police told Grover that they would bring his
cooperation to the attention of the court slated to determine his sen-
tence.' 0 4 With this assurance in hand, Grover agreed to cooperate.
Not long after Grover and the authorities made their agreement,
Grover called Hinton and engaged in some small talk.l05 Grover
called Hinton again the next day and asked if she was "doing any-
thing," a cryptic way of asking if she was selling drugs.l06 She re-
plied that she "didn't do that kind of stuff anymore."' 0 7 The next
night Grover telephoned Hinton again, but he hung up after she
again stated she was no longer involved in drugs.' 0 8 For the next
(6) the defendant's reputation;
(7) the conduct of the defendant during the negotiations with the under-
cover agent;
(8) whether the defendant has refused to commit similar acts on other
occasions;
(9) the nature of the crime charged; and
(10) "[tlhe degree of coercion present in the instigation law officers have
contributed to the transaction" relative to the "defendant's criminal
background."
United States v. Dion, 762 F.2d 674, 687-88 (8th Cir. 1985) (quoting federal cases to
support each factor).
Citing the Supreme Court's articulation of a flexible, multi-factor analysis of pre-
disposition, the court in Dion declined the government's suggestion that it "eschew
an examination of the myriad factors used by the courts to determine predisposition
.... Id at 685. While the court did examine some of the ten factors cited for pur-
poses of determining whether each of the involved defendants was predisposed, the
court did not examine each of the ten factors, and it did not expressly adopt these ten
factors as the standard by which predisposition is to be analyzed in future decisions.
101. 908 F.2d 355 (8th Cir. 1990).
102. Hinton had located cocaine suppliers for Grover on three occasions. The last
transaction took place approximately four months before Hinton's arrest. Id. at 356.
103. Id
104. Id. Enlisting the cooperation of charged or convicted criminal offenders to
aid in police investigations in return for the possibility of a reduced sentence is a
standard and long-standing law enforcement practice. See Donnelly, supra note 2, at
1092-94.
105. During this conversation Grover told Hinton about his arrest. Hinton, 908
F.2d at 356.
106. See id.
107. Both Hinton and Grover understood this to mean that she was no longer
involved in selling drugs. Id.
108. Id.
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few days, Hinton stopped taking any phone calls.109 Several days
later, Grover called Hinton again to ask if she knew of a source from
which he could get some cocaine. Again she told him that she did
not. After this call, Hinton left her home to visit her sister and left
her cordless telephone with a neighbor. The neighbor testified that
the next day, while she still had Hinton's cordless telephone, she re-
ceived eight to ten urgent calls from Grover asking for Hinton.1lO
Hinton returned home later that day and retrieved the telephone
from her neighbor. At seven o'clock the next morning, she received
yet another call from Grover.",1 Grover told Hinton he had some
friends visiting from out of town and asked her if she could locate
some cocaine for them; Hinton again told him she could not."t 2
Later that day Grover inundated Hinton with telephone calls. He
telephoned her at noon and again at three o'clock that afternoon."t 3
After the three o'clock call, Grover began calling Hinton every fif-
teen minutes until Hinton finally relented and agreed to locate a
drug source for Grover.'14
Hinton and Grover arranged a drug transaction to take place in a
restaurant parking lot later that evening.115 Hinton and the drug
source arrived at the parking lot, as did Grover accompanied by po-
lice officers posing as Grover's out-of-town friends.I16 Once the
transaction was consummated, Hinton was arrested.117 A jury tried
and convicted Hinton of one count of aiding and abetting the distri-
bution of cocaine 118 and one count of conspiracy to distribute co-
caine. 19 On appeal, Hinton argued that she had been entrapped as
a matter of law.120
109. The court's opinion does not indicate whether Grover stopped calling or
whether he was unable to speak with Hinton because she was avoiding him. See id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. The opinion does not discuss the exact substance of these conversations.
Presumably they were similar to the preceding calls: Grover asking Hinton if she
would find him drugs, and Hinton declining to do so. See id. at 356.
114. Again, the court does not discuss the substance of these conversations or
specify when Hinton finally agreed to find drugs for Grover. Therefore, there is no
way to calculate exactly how many phone calls Grover placed to Hinton after three
o'clock before she agreed to locate a drug source for him. Id.
115. Apparently, Grover made all the telephone calls to Hinton from the Office of
the Hennepin County Sheriff. See id. at 356-57.
116. Id. at 357.
117. Id.
118. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1988) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1988), respectively.
119. 21 U.S.C. § 846.
120. Hinton, 908 F.2d at 357. If ajury rejects the entrapment defense and convicts
the defendant, on appeal the defendant must establish entrapment as a matter of law:
To make that showing the evidence must clearly have indicated that a gov-
ernment agent originated the criminal design; that the agent implanted in
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III. THE HINTON DECISION
At trial, Hinton testified that she stopped her involvement with
drugs three months prior to the drug transaction which resulted in
her arrest.' 2' Grover, who at the time was an agent of the govern-
ment,' 2 2 initially suggested that Hinton return to her old ways and
become involved in an illegal drug transaction with him.123 Hinton
was clearly reluctant to coordinate a drug transaction for Grover, de-
clining numerous requests to procure cocaine for him. Grover had
to make repeated and persistent attempts to overcome Hinton's con-
tinued reluctance before he ultimately succeeded in engaging
Hinton in a drug transaction.124
Initial reluctance, overcome only by repeated government solicita-
tion, is considered by the Supreme Court to be strong evidence that
the defendant was not predisposed to commit the crime, and was
the mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit the offense; and
that the defendant then committed the criminal act at the urging of the gov-
ernment agent.
United States v. Shaw, 570 F.2d 770, 772 (8th Cir. 1978). To establish entrapment as
a matter of law, the defendant's lack of predisposition to commit the crime must be
apparent from the uncontradicted evidence. United States v. Lazcano, 881 F.2d 402,
405 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Navarro, 737 F.2d 625, 634, cert. denied sub nom.
Mugercia v. United States, 469 U.S. 1020 (1984). Not all jurisdictions recognize en-
trapment as a matter of law. See, e.g., United States v. Markovic, 911 F.2d 613, 616
(11 th Cir. 1990) ("Entrapment as a matter of law is no longer a viable defense in this
Circuit.").
121. Hinton, 908 F.2d at 356.
122. Id. at 357. The court did not analyze this point. Apparently, the court read-
ily concluded that since the government enlisted the services of Grover, he was,
therefore, its agent. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
The defense of entrapment cannot be raised when the defendant is induced into
committing a crime by a private person. The person soliciting the defendant's partic-
ipation in a criminal act must be an agent of the government for the entrapment
defense to arise. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 442 (1972) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting). See also Holloway v. United States, 432 F.2d 775, 776 (10th Cir. 1970);
Carbajal-Portillo v. United States, 396 F.2d 944, 948 (9th Cir. 1968); Henderson v.
United States, 237 F.2d 169, 175 (5th Cir. 1956).
Given that the entrapment defense is not available to a defendant induced into
committing a crime by a private person, advocates of the objective formulation of the
entrapment defense conclude that the focus of the entrapment defense must be on
the government's conduct and not on the defendant's predisposition. As Justice
Stewart stated:
That [the defendant] was induced, provoked or tempted [to commit the
crime] by government agents does not make him any more innocent or less
predisposed than he would be if he had been induced, provoked, or tempted
by a private person-which of course, would not entitle him to cry "entrap-
ment." Since the only difference between these situations is the identity of
the tempter, it follows that the significant focus must be on the conduct of
the government agents, and not on the predisposition of the defendant.
Russell, 411 U.S. at 442 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
123. Hinton, 908 F.2d at 356.
124. Id.
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therefore entrapped.t 25 The Eighth Circuit itself has acknowledged
that reluctance, worn-down only by repeated solicitation or induce-
ment, is the most important factor in determining the defendant's
predisposition.126 In Hinton, the court acknowledged that Grover
"telephoned Hinton ad nauseam" in an attempt to involve her in an
illegal drug transaction.12 7 Nonetheless, without discussing the ex-
tent of her continued reluctance and the repeated efforts that were
necessary to overcome this reluctance, the court determined that the
record established that Hinton was predisposed to commit the crime
for which she was charged.128 Other than noting that the informant
Grover phoned Hinton unceasingly until she relented and agreed to
find him a supplier of cocaine, the court did not address the issue of
governmental conduct in this sting operation.129
125. In Russell, the Supreme Court noted that in both Sherman and Sorrells "it ap-
pears that the Government agent gained the confidence of the defendant and, de-
spite initial reluctance, the defendant finally acceded to the repeated importunings of the
agent to commit the criminal act." Russell, 411 U.S. at 429 (emphasis added).
Numerous other courts discuss the importance of reluctance and the repeated
solicitation by police necessary to overcome the defendant's reluctance. The Elev-
enth Circuit stated that the defendant can prevail with an entrapment defense by
showing "[tihat he had not favorably received the government plan, and the govern-
ment had to 'push it' on him, or that several attempts at setting up an illicit deal had
failed and on at least one occasion [the defendant] had directly refused to partici-
pate." United States v. Andrews, 765 F.2d 1491, 1499 (11th Cir. 1985) (citations
omitted). Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit found the crucial factor to be whether a
defendant expressed reluctance to commit the offense which was overcome only by
repeated government inducement or persuasion. United States v. Perez-Leon, 757
F.2d 866, 871 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 99 (1985). See also United States v.
McLernon, 746 F.2d 1098, 1113-14 (6th Cir. 1984) (Entrapment found where drug
transaction was committed only after agent became close friends with the defendant
and repeatedly solicited his involvement.); United States v. Knight, 604 F. Supp. 984
(S.D. Ohio 1985) (Entrapment found when agent had to ask defendant twice to saw
off shotgun that defendant was selling before defendant agreed to do so.).
Likewise, state courts are sensitive to the importance of the efforts required to
overcome a defendant's reluctance. As stated by a California court: "What we do
care about is how much and what manner of persuasion, pressure, and cajoling are
brought to bear by law enforcement officials to induce persons to commit crimes."
People v. Barraza, 23 Cal. 3d 675, 688, 591 P.2d 947, 954, 153 Cal. Rptr. 459, 466
(1979).
126. United States v. Dougherty, 810 F.2d 763, 769 (8th Cir. 1987); United States
v. Lard, 734 F.2d 1290, 1294-95 (8th Cir. 1984).
127. Hinton, 908 F.2d at 358.
128. See id.
129. Id. This is no doubt due to the fact that the subjective test formulated by the
Supreme Court and followed by the Eighth Circuit focuses on the defendant's predis-
position to commit the offense charged and places little or no emphasis on the con-
duct or actions of the government. Therefore, Eighth Circuit decisions concerning
entrapment are generally devoid of any analysis of police conduct. See, e.g., United
States v. Williams, 873 F.2d 1102, 1104 (8th Cir. 1989) (summarily upholding de-
fendant's conviction despite defendant's contention that informant used appeals to
friendship to induce the defendant into selling cocaine).
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The court did, however, cite two factors which formed the basis for
its legal determination that Hinton was predisposed. First, Hinton
had located drug sources for Grover in the past.'So Second, the
court was troubled by the fact that Hinton would have realized a
profit on the transaction if she had not been arrested.11 While these
two factors no doubt bear on whether Hinton was predisposed to
commit the crime,132 the court failed to critically examine the most
crucial fact-the repetitive solicitation necessary to overcome
Delecia Hinton's persistent refusal to participate in the illegal drug
transaction. This type of review stops short of the level of mutual
examination originally envisioned by the architects of the subjective
standard.13s
A. Mutual Examination of Conduct
In Sorrells, the Court stated that there must be a mutual examina-
tion of the parties' conduct.134 The trial court is to consider the gov-
ernment's conduct on one hand and the defendant's conduct and
predisposition on the other.135 As the Court stated:
The Government in such a case is in no position to object to evi-
dence of the activities of its representatives in relation to the ac-
cused, and if the defendant seeks acquittal by reason of entrapment
he cannot complain of an appropriate and searching inquiry into
his own conduct and predisposition as bearing on that issue. 136
Hinton is only one in a long line of federal cases which, subsequent to
Sorrells, lost sight of the scope of the inquiry envisioned under the
subjective formulation of the entrapment defense.13 7 In decisions
130. The last such transaction took place about four months prior to Hinton's
arrest. Id. at 358.
131. The drug source that Hinton located testified that he charged Hinton $8,000
for the eight ounces of cocaine involved in the transaction. Hinton sold the cocaine
to the undercover police officers for $8,800. Hinton would have realized an $800
profit on the transaction had she not been arrested. Id. at 358. In contrast, the
Supreme Court in Sherman noted that there was no evidence that Sherman made a
profit on the drug transaction which lead to his arrest. Sherman v. United States, 356
U.S. 369, 375 (1958).
132. See supra text accompanying notes 97-98.
133. One must keep in mind that in early entrapment cases, the Supreme Court
spoke of mutual examination. Mutual examination included an evaluation of govern-
ment conduct on one hand and the defendant's predisposition on the other. See Sher-
man, 356 U.S. at 373; United States v. Sorrells, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932).
134. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451.
135. Id.
136. Id
137. In decisions subsequent to Sor-ells and Sherman, the Supreme Court indicated
that a mutual examination of conduct is no longer required and that the scope of the
inquiry is now exclusively on the defendant. In Russell, the Court noted that the en-
trapment defense focuses on the intent or predisposition of the defendant to commit
the crime. To support its point, the Court lifted a partial quote from Sorrells, stating
1991l
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prior to Hinton, the Eighth Circuit seriously examined the repetitive
efforts employed by law enforcement officers and their informants in
the solicitation of criminal conduct. The watershed case addressing
this issue is United States v. Lard.138
B. The Lard Decision
In Lard, a friend of Lard's unwittingly introduced Lard to an un-
dercover agent of the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Fire-
arms.' 39 Lard's friend had previously indicated to the agent that
Lard might have a shotgun for sale. When introduced to Lard at
Lard's apartment, the agent asked Lard if his shotgun was for sale;
Lard said it was not. The agent then asked Lard if he had any other
firearms for sale. Lard said he had a small detonator for sale. Lard
showed the agent a small detonator and offered to sell it for $100.
The agent told Lard the price was too high and that he needed some-
thing more powerful. Lard then presented shotgun shells which
could be taped to the detonator to produce a more powerful effect.
The agent again stated that the price was too high.
At this point it was suggested that a pipe bomb might be most
effective for the agent's stated purpose of blowing up a car. 140 After
that "'if the defendant seeks acquittal by reason of entrapment he cannot complain
of an appropriate and searching inquiry into his own conduct and predisposition as
bearing upon that issue.'" United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 429 (1973) (quot-
ing Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451). Unfortunately, the Russell opinion excludes the portion
of the original Sorrells language which immediately precedes the quoted segment and
constitutes the other side of the examination: "The Government in such a case is in
no position to object to evidence of the activities of its representatives in relation to
the accused .... " Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451.
After Russell, it was still arguable that there must be at least some mutual exami-
nation of conduct, although not a balanced one, under the subjective standard. The
Court's decision in Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976), however, further
erodes the scope of the examination of police conduct under the subjective entrap-
ment standard. In Hampton, the Court clarified its Russell holding, stating that Russell
completely foreclosed the "possibility that the defense of entrapment could ever be
based upon governmental misconduct in a case, such as this one, where the predispo-
sition of the defendant to commit the crime was established." Id. at 488-89. While
only a plurality of the Court agreed with this pronouncement, the concept of an ex-
amination which focuses exclusively on the defendant seems to have already gained
ground in the Eighth Circuit.
The Eighth Circuit recently seemed to abandon any pretext of a mutual exami-
nation of conduct in entrapment cases. As the court states in Gunderson v. Schlue-
ter, 904 F.2d 407 (8th Cir. 1990), "the inquiry in an entrapment situation must be on
the defendant's own predisposition to commit the crime, and not on the tactics em-
ployed by the police to entice him into the crime." Id. at 410.
138. 734 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1984).
139. Id. at 1292.
140. Id. There is some dispute as to who first presented the idea of using a pipe
bomb to blow up a car. The agent stated that Lard's friend first suggested using a
pipe bomb. Lard and his friend stated that the agent first suggested the need for a
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this suggestion was broached, Lard again offered to sell the agent the
detonator and shotgun shells. The agent again declined the offer.
Then, after reflecting for a few minutes, Lard agreed to make a pipe
bomb for the agent. He told the agent the bomb would be ready in
three hours.141 When the agent returned to retrieve the bomb, Lard
showed the agent how the bomb could be attached to a car's radio,
hot wire, engine coil or gasoline tank.' 42 As a result of this transac-
tion, Lard was charged, tried, and convicted of making and possess-
ing a destructive device, conspiracy to transfer, and transferring an
unregistered firearm.143 On appeal, Lard claimed he had been en-
trapped as a matter of law.'44
C. Lard and Hinton: A Comparison
A comparison of Lard and Hinton suggests a disparate application
of the entrapment theory. Applying the federal standard of entrap-
ment, 145 the Lard court stated that resolution of a defendant's en-
trapment claim under the subjective standard requires an
"examination of the defendant's personal background" and an ex-
amination of "the extent to which the government agent has endeav-
ored to instigate, importune, or induce the commission of the
criminal act" by the defendant.146 In Lard, the court examined the
conduct of both Lard and the government agent during the encoun-
ter and held that Lard had been entrapped.t47 In reaching its con-
clusion, the court focused on two factors: Lard's reluctance to
participate in the illegal transaction and his lack of a criminal record.
First, the court noted that Lard did not initially suggest making a
pipe bomb, and that he was hesitant about undertaking the illegal
pipe bomb. In either case, it is clear that Lard was not the first to suggest that he
build a pipe bomb. Id.
141. The agent and Lard's friend left the apartment and returned later to pick up
the bomb. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1291. The term "firearm" includes, within its definition, "a destructive
device." 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a) (1988). A "destructive device" is defined in part as
"any explosive incendiary or poison gas ... bomb." Id. § 5845(f). If a person makes
a destructive device, the person violates 26 U.S.C. § 5861(f). Possession of such a
device is a violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(c). Transferring a destructive device is a
violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(e). Conspiracy to transfer such a device is a violation of
18 U.S.C. § 371.
144. Lard, 734 F.2d at 1291.
145. The Lard decision sets forth the language of the subjective test for determin-
ing entrapment, but the court also quotes extensive portions ofJustice Frankfurter's
concurring opinion in Sherman which advocates the objective standard. Id. at 1295-
96.
146. Id. at 1293.
147. Id. at 1292-96.
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project.148 Like Lard, Hinton was not the one who proposed the
illicit drug transaction, and she expressed reluctance to become in-
volved in the illegal plan.149 The reluctance expressed by Hinton
took place over a period of days amidst a barrage of solicitations.1 50
In contrast, Lard was faced with only one solicitation and expressed
only mild and fleeting reluctance, agreeing to participate in the ille-
gal act only moments after the opportunity to do so was first
presented to him. 15, The court noted that Lard's reluctance was not
as sustained or substantial as the reluctance exhibited by the defend-
ant in Sherman v. United States,152 but characterized this distinction as
unimportant, calling it a "difference of degree, not kind."t53
The court in Hinton reasoned that Hinton's ability to locate a drug
source indicated her predisposition to commit a drug offense.154
Yet, the Lard court was not willing to draw the same inference from
Lard's ability to construct a pipe bomb in three hours or from his
display of expertise in this illegal craft as shown by his demonstration
148. Id.
The Lard court's application of the subjective standard to the particular facts may
justify criticism. Lard is, at best, a very weak entrapment case. In Lard, the govern-
ment agent contacted the defendant on only one occasion and made only one solici-
tation of the defendant. Lard demonstrated minimal and fleeting reluctance before
he agreed to make a pipe bomb. Lard made the bomb quickly and displayed his
expertise at the craft by showing the agent how the bomb had been constructed, how
the bomb worked, and how the bomb could be rigged to a car in various ways to
make the car explode. Id. at 1292. All of this conduct is very strong evidence of
predisposition. See supra note 77.
On these weak facts, the court found entrapment as a matter of law. Moreover,
the court stated that the case very nearly constituted a due process violation which
would bar the defendant's conviction. Lard, 734 F.2d at 1296. The court seemed
particularly disturbed by the testimony of a defense witness who stated that the gov-
ernment agent smoked marijuana during this encounter. Apparently this evidence
was not disputed by the prosecution. Id. at 1297. The Lard facts do not add up to
much of an entrapment case, much less a case constituting a violation of due process
principles. Cf United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978) (Overreaching
nature of police involvement barred prosecution of defendants for illegal manufac-
ture of illicit drugs.).
The case of United States v. Pfeffer, 901 F.2d 654 (8th Cir. 1990), bears striking
similarities to the Lard case, and as in Lard, the court dismissed many facts which
clearly indicated the defendant's predisposition to commit illegal acts. Id. at 655-57.
The court characterized the Pfeffer case as one where the efforts of the government
"brought it perilously near" to a case of entrapment as a matter of law. Id. at 656-57.
149. United States v. Hinton, 908 F.2d 355, 356 (8th Cir. 1990).
150. Id. at 356-57.
151. When first asked to build a pipe bomb, Lard did not say "no." Lard merely
repeated his offer to sell the agent a detonator and some shotgun shells. After the
agent did not accept Lard's offer, Lard "paus[ed] for a few minutes" and then agreed
to make the pipe bomb. Lard, 734 F.2d at 1292.
152. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
153. Lard, 734 F.2d at 1295.
154. See Hinton, 908 F.2d at 358.
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of four alternative methods to rig the bomb to cause a car
explosion. '55
The Lard court was also impressed by the fact that Lard had no
prior criminal record or known dealings in illegal firearms.156 In
Hinton, the prosecution did not introduce any evidence of a criminal
record to establish Hinton's predisposition.157
When analyzed in light of the principles set forth in Lard, the
court's analysis in Hinton is incomplete. The only material distinc-
tion between Lard and Hinton is the existence of evidence establish-
ing that Hinton had been involved in illegal drug transactions in the
past. '58 Delecia Hinton never denied her past involvement with ille-
gal drugs.159 She testified only that she had divorced herself from
the world of drugs to benefit herself and her children.160 One can-
not judge the truth of this claim or the sincerity of her effort. One
can, however, examine the efforts employed to enlist her participa-
tion in the drug sale which ultimately led to her conviction. Hinton
refused the advances of her former friend, turned informant, on at
least seven occasions before she conceded to find him a drug
source.' 6 1 She testified that Grover's constant demands pushed her
into participating in the illegal transaction because she had no way to
escape his demands. 162 Perhaps Hinton never sincerely tried to
clean up her life.163 On the other hand, perhaps she was trying to
change her ways, and perhaps she would have succeeded if not for
the repeated cajoling and persistent solicitation undertaken by the
155. Lard, 734 F.2d at 1294-95.
156. Id at 1294.
157. The opinion in Hinton does not expressly state that no evidence of a criminal
record was presented at trial. See Hinton, 908 F.2d at 356-57. Presumably, however,
if Hinton had a prior conviction or arrest record, that record would have been intro-
duced and used at trial. Since the prosecution relied on evidence that Hinton had
previously been involved in drug transactions, rather than relying on evidence of past
convictions or arrests for drug offenses, the reasonable conclusion is that no past
convictions or arrests existed. Id
158. Compare Hinton, 908 F.2d at 358, with Lard, 734 F.2d at 1294.
159. Hinton, 908 F.2d at 356.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 357.
163. Under the Hinton facts, a jury could reasonably find that Delecia Hinton was
an "unwary criminal," rather than an "unwary innocent." Hinton knew Grover had
been arrested. Id at 356. She communicated to her sister her concern that some-
thing might go wrong with the drug transaction prior to meeting Grover. Id. at 357.
Given these facts, Hinton's reluctance could have exhibited her fear of being set up,
rather than a lack of predisposition. The court did not, however, base its finding of
no entrapment on these facts. See id. at 358.
In any case, the court departed from past principles by failing to apply a critical
portion of entrapment analysis: the effect of the repeated solicitations used to over-
come Hinton's ongoing reluctance to participate in the illegal transaction.
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government's agent, Robert Grover.164
CONCLUSION
Given the present manner in which courts apply the subjective
standard of entrapment, a defendant who has committed prior illegal
acts involving drugs is forever labeled "predisposed" and is essen-
tially foreclosed from successfully invoking the entrapment defense.
Regardless of whether a person's past drug involvement resulted in
conviction or arrest, evidence of drug activityl 6 5 is admissible. For
all practical purposes, this evidence automatically defeats any claim
that the government entrapped the defendant. Virtually any evi-
dence of prior bad acts, similar to the crime charged, dooms the de-
fendant to being labeled "predisposed." Under the subjective test,
the court does not meaningfully examine police conduct in encour-
aging the defendant's criminal conduct. By focusing on the prior
misdeeds of the accused, the police may establish predisposition and
pursue prior drug offenders overzealously, confident that proof of
prior criminal activity will defeat any claim of entrapment.'
6 6
A serious disparity exists between what is permissible police con-
duct in soliciting criminal activity from "innocent" and "predis-
posed" individuals. A defendant with a clean record and good
reputation, such as Lard, can establish entrapment where the gov-
ernment engages in minimal efforts to elicit criminal conduct.167 On
the other hand, a defendant with a tainted reputation, such as
Hinton, cannot establish entrapment when government officials ex-
hibit extended and repeated efforts to persuade the defendant to
commit an illegal act. 16 8 One must ask: What societal objective is
served by undertaking persistent efforts to induce so-called "predis-
posed" individuals into committing crimes when these individuals
claim to be trying to overcome and avoid the type of conduct which
164. See id. at 356. Justice Frankfurter stated that the immense power of govern-
ment is misdirected "when employed to promote rather than detect crime and to
bring about the downfall of those who, left to themselves, might well have obeyed the
law." Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 384 (1958) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
165. Few courts discuss the impact of the subjective test and the admission of
evidence of prior convictions on the goal of rehabilitation. Justice Frankfurter is one
of the few to have addressed this issue. In his concurring opinion in Sherman v. United
States, Justice Frankfurter stated that past convictions do not "open [the defendant]
to police practices, aimed at securing his repeated conviction, from which the ordi-
nary citizen is protected. The whole ameliorative hopes of modern penology and
prison administration strongly counsel against such a view." Sherman, 356 U.S. at
383.
166. See Park, supra note 3, at 212.
167. See United States v. Lard, 734 F.2d 1290, 1992 (8th Cir. 1984).
168. See Hinton, 908 F.2d at 356-57.
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gave rise to their "predisposition"?1 69 At the very least, the court
should examine the efforts that law enforcement officials and agents
undertook to elicit the defendant's illegal conduct.
For a defendant labeled "predisposed," the last gasp defense is
that the government agents went too far in soliciting and inducing
the criminal conduct and that due process principles should bar the
defendant's conviction. Within the Eighth Circuit, however, this de-
fense presently exists on a theoretical level only.170 This circuit has
not determined the standard for establishing governmental conduct
so outrageous as to bar conviction of a predisposed defendant.'
7 '
The type of repeated solicitation and badgering which took place in
Hinton would most likely not meet this standard.
In Hinton v. United States, the Eighth Circuit bypassed a prime op-
portunity to critically examine the application of the subjective for-
mulation of the entrapment defense in cases involving the repeated
and persistent solicitation of individuals who have engaged in prior
illegal drug transactions. More importantly, the court in Hinton
failed to give weight to the legal principle enunciated in Lard, that a
defendant's initial reluctance to commit an illegal act is of paramount
importance in the entrapment analysis. In casting aside the use of
this critical factor, the court signalled that it will limit the scope of
the entrapment defense even more severely in the future.
Troy A. Wolf
169. The Second Circuit stated that the entrapment doctrine originates from a
revulsion against using the powers of government "to beguile innocent, though duc-
tile, persons into lapses which they might otherwise resist." United States v. Becker,
62 F.2d 1007, 1009 (2d Cir. 1933).
170. See supra note 43.
171. Id
1991]
31
Wolf: Criminal Law—Persistence Pays: Enforcement Efforts to Solicit Ill
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1991
32
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 9
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol17/iss3/9
